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[L. A. No. 25717.

In Bank.

May 13, 1060.]

THOMAS E. HULL, Petitioner, v. TIlE SUPERIOR COPRT
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; GERALINE HULL, Real Party in Interest.

)

[1] Divorce-Final Judgment-Mandamus to Compel Entry.-If a
husband against whom an interlocutory divorce decree was
obtained is entitled to entry of the final decree as a matter of
right, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel entry of such
decree.
[2] Id.-FinaJ. Judgment-Where Movant Is in Contempt of Court.
-It is within the discretion of the trial court to bar entry
of a final divorce decree if the moving party is in contempt
of an order or process of court relating to the divorce action,
even where there has been no prior adjudication of contempt
and none is sought.
[3] Id.-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings.-Failure
to comply with the terms of a property settlement agreement
is not punishable by contempt. This rule applies though the
payments in default were designated as child support if these
support payments are part of the integrated property settlement.
[4] Id.-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings.-Obligations arising under a property settlement agreement, though
the agreement is incorporated in a divorce decree, are con[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 128.
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 136.
McK. Dig. References: [1) Di\'orce, § 121(7); [2,10,11] Divorce,
§121(5); [3,4] Divorce, §260; [5,8,12, 16-:ZZ] Divorce, §121;
[6] Divorce, § 5; [7] Divorce, § 60; [9] Cuntempt, § 3; (13-15]
Divorce, § 219.
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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tractual, and con telll pt canHot be US I'd to puni~h Illere brl'aeh
of contract.
[5] ld.-Final Judgment-Where There Bas Been Breach of Contract.-Eutry of a final divorce decree IlIay not be barred because of a IlIere breach of an integrated property settlement
agreement, since to countenance such procedure would be violative of public policy, which is not to discourage final and
permanent severance of marriages that have failed.
[6] Id.-Public Policy.-When a marriage has failed and the
family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life are
no longer served and divorce will be permitted. Public policy
does not discourage divorce where the relations between husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of matrimony hm'e been destroyed.
[7] ld.-Recrimination.-It is not a suffieient basis for denying an
interlocutory divorce decree that petitioner is also found to be
at "fault" (Civ. Code, § 13:!).
[8] ld.-Final Judgment.-Where it has been determined that
grounds for legal dissolution of a marriage exist (Civ. Code,
§ 92) and an interlocutory divorce decree has been granted,
the courts should not bar entry of the final decree on expiration of the intel'loeutory year except for compelling reasons.
[9] Contempt-Power of Court.-A court should have the right to
deny its processes and aid to one who stands in contempt or is
in contempt of its orders. One who has wilfully refused to
comply with the mandate of a court cannot then compel that
court to do his bidding.
[10] Divorce-Final Judgment-Where Movant Is in Contempt of
Court.-Though the moving party has been adjudicated in contempt, the court is not required to bar entry of a final divorce
judgment; sueh action remains within the trial court's discretion. If the eourt determines that the public interest will be
better served by finally and permanently dissolving the marital
status, it is entirely within its power to do so.
[11] Id.-Final Judgment-Where Movant Is not in Contempt of
Court.-If one who stands in contempt of the orders of court
can still seek, and in the discretion of the eourt receive, a final
divorce decree, OIle who is not in contempt and who could not
be adjudged in contempt should stand on a higher plane. If the
court lacks the power to illlpo~e the punishment of contempt,
it should not be permitted to asse;;s what is a greater punishment-denial of the legal right to enter into any other relationship; to do so would be to permit the eourt to inflict the continuance of a repudiated marriage relationship on a party
because of a claimed breach of contract.
[12] Id.-Final Judgment.-The marital relationship is severable
from the property rights which it creates, and final settlement
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of the rt'iatiollship ~h()uld not be d('pendt'llt on final settlement of eoroll:1 ,'Y I'l'Opt'rty intel't'sts.
[13] ld.-Disposition of Property-Concept of Divisible Divorce.The cOllcept of di\'i~ihle divorce-namely, that severance of
the personal l'elatinnship is divisible from a determination
of property and support rights-has become established in our
law.
[14] ld.-Disposition of Property-Concept of Divisible Divorce.The divisible di\'orce is more than a jurisdictional concept.
Severnnce of a personal relationship which the law has found
to be unworkable nnd, as a result, injurious to the public welfare is not dependmt on final settlement of property disputes.
[15] ld.-Disposition of Property-Concept of Divisible Divorce.If husband and wife choose to enter into a property agreement, termination of their personal status should not he conditioned on compliance with this agreeinellt. If they enter into
an integrated property settlement which provides for support paymcnts as well as property allocation, the entire agreement is considered a property agreement and should be divisible
in toto from the final dissolution of their personal status;
otherwise property disputes, real and specious, could continue
for years, effeetively preventing' the establishment of any other
relationship by either party.
[16] Id.-Final Judgment.-Where divorced parties hnve entered
into a negotiated contraet and that contract is breached, normal
contract remcdies are available, and if the trial court were
permitted to bar entry of 11 final divorce decree because it has
determined that the contrllct was brenched, nn effective remedy
of the eourt, heretofore reserved for contempt cases, would
become a snpple11lentlll remedy for bn-nch of contract.
[17] ld.-Final Judgment.-Where a wife, subsequent to obtaining'
an interlocutory divorce decree, filed an action against the husband for breach of a negotiated contract and such action is
pending, it is improper to pcrmit the withholding of the final
divorce decree sought by the husband as a club to prevent
normal determination of contract rights in the contract action.
[18] ld.-Final Judgment-Fraud.-A trial court has power to bar
entry of a final divorce decree if the moving party attempts
to obtain it by fraudulent means. Even n final decree can be
vncatpd if it has heen ohtained by fraud.
[19] ld.-Final Judgment-Fraud.-If a divorepd hushnnd were
to be prc(·!tult·d from ohtaining a Hnal di\'lll'ee deerl'e because
of alleged fraud in averring in his supporting affidavit for its
entry that he ha:; complied with all the recjuirements of the
interlocutory decree where he alleged that he was not in default and that his failure to COlli ply with certain terms of
the interlocutory decl'ee was l'xcusahll', then a pending action
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for breaeh of eOlltrnct brought hy till' wif!', in whi<'h hl' woul,l
seck to prove that he was not ill default, would be prejuilgl'd
in ndv:lIlce.
[20] ld.-Final Judgment-Fraud.-An affi,lavit filed by a ilivorcrd
husbnnd in support of his request for a final decree did not
perpetrate a "frnud" on the court because he averred therein
that he complied with all the requirements of the interlocutory
decree where all the facts involved in a property dispute between the parties, made the subject of a pending contract
action brought by the wife, were before the court, the wife
had already filed her nffidavits setting forth the husband's
claimed mi~deeds in conjunction with her motion to bnr entry
of the final decree, and the husband, three days before the
anegedly frnudulent affidavit was filed, filed a stntement in
opposition to the wife's motion in which he set forth the facts
involved in the property dispute and explained why his failure
to comply with the decree was excusable.
l21] ld.-Final Judgment-Effect of Marriage Subsequent to Interlocutory Decree.-Entry of a final divorce decree is not a
reward for good behavior nor is the refusal to grant it a
punishment. Its purpose is to finany dissolve a relntionship
which has been severed in fact, and it would serve no legitimate purpose to compel the husband, if he has "remarried"
in :Mexico, but lives in California, to continue to live in It state
of bigamy as punishment for already having done so.
[22] ld.-Final Judgment-Effect of Marriage Subsequent to Interlocutory Decree.-A bigamous marriage consummated during the interlocutory year is not adequate justification for
denying the bigamous party a final divorce decree. The law
does not condemn an individual to eternal illicit relationships
because he has once erred simply because it does not approve
of the way in which the union was commenced.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the entry of a final
divorce judgment. Writ granted.
Edward M. Raskin and Paul P. Selvin for Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, and Edward A. Nugent,
Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
Covey & Covey and Jules J. Covey for Real Party in Interest.
PETERS, J.-Geraline Hull secured an interlocutory decree
of di';orce from her husband, Thomas E. Hull. About 11
months later Gcralille moved the trial eOllrt to bar the entry
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of the final drcree if her husband should seek to have such a
decree cntcred. Shortly thereafter, and after the required
one-year period had rlapsed, Thomas moved for entry of the
final drcree. The trial court granted Geraline's motion.
Thomas petitions for a writ of mandate to compel the entry
of thc final, contending that he is entitled to such entry as a
matter of right. With this contention we agree.
The facts are as follows: On September 3, 1958, after an
uncontested hearing, Geraline secured an interlocutory decree
of divorce. The decree incorporated an integrated property
settlement agreement previously negotiated by the parties.
This agreement provided, among other things, for the conveyance of property then in escrow (subject to an exchange
agreement by virtue of which Thomas was to convey certain
property owned by him and receive the particular property
specified in the settlement) to Geraline, alimony, child support, vacation payments for the children, and execution by
Thomas of an irrevocable will creating trust funds for Geraline
and the children.
On February 13, 1959, Geraline initiated a contempt proceeding against Thomas, alleging that he had failed to convey
the property to her, had failed to execute his will as agreed,
and had remarried in Mexico in February and was transferring valuable property to his new "wife." Geraline did not
appear at the hearing and no evidence was introduced. The
contempt proceeding was dismissed.
In April, 1959, Geraline filed a "Notice of Motion in re:
Determination of Liability of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant
for Breach of Certain Provisions of the Interlocutory Judgment of Divorce ... " In May the trial court entered its determination to the effect that Thomas had not breached the
agreement. This order was subsequently vacated, and the
court thcn ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the
decree.
In July, 1959, Geraline commenced a civil action against
Thomas and Lynn Starr (his new "wife") to restrain Thomas
fronl violating the decree, to restrain Lynn Starr from receiving any property belonging to Thomas, and to require Thomas
to either convey the property included in the settlement or to
pay to ller $150,000 ill cash. (The property was valued at
$144,000 by the parties.) That civil action is still pending.
In August, 1959, Geraline filed a motion to prevent the
entry of the final decree. She alleged the same acts of contract
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breach as in the previous proccedings. She allmitted that
Thomas did not actually have the real property to whieh
she was entitled because the exchange contemplated had newr
been made, but alleged that this had occurred only because
Thomas had refused to complete the escrow. Affidavits of her
attorney and of her real estate broker was submitted to support
this contention. She further alleged that certain payments
for the children's vacations had not been made.
Thomas, by counteraffidavit, admitted noncompliance with
the contract, but alleged: (1) That the vacation payments
had not been made because the children had not taken vacations, and that he had been forced to rescue his son from
juYt'nile court proceedings initiated by Geraline (she denied
this) ; and, (2) that the escrow had not been completed because the other parties to it had disapproved of the covenants
attached to his property, and not through any wilful action
on his part. He moved for entry of the final decree.
After several hearings, the trial court granted Gcraline's
motion to bar entry of the final decree of divorce. It is this
order which gives rise to the present petition for a writ of
mandate to compel the court to enter the final decree.
[1] If Thomas is entitled to entry of the final decree as
a matter of right, then mandate is the proper remedy. (Olaudius v. Melvin, 146 Cal. 257 [79 P. 897] ; see also McGuinness v.
$uperior Court, 196 Cal. 222 [237 P. 42. 40 A.L.R. 1110] ;
Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250 [165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R.
]589J; Stewart v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 702 [40 P.2d
529] ; Isakson v. Superior Court, 130 Ca1.App. 180 [19 P.2d
840] ; Neu,,'cU v. Superior Oourt, 27 Cal.App. 343 [149 P. 998].)
Thomas contends that since tht're is neither fraud nor mistake
invoh'ed in the present dispute, and since he cannot be punished by contempt for breach of an integrated property
agreement even though his breach is found to be wilful, the
trial court has no discretion to bar entry of the final decree.
[2] It is, of course, within the discretion of the trial court
to bar entry of the final decree of divorce if the moving party
is in contempt of an order or process of the court relating
to the divorce action. (W ceks v. Superior Oourt, 187 Cal. 620
[203 P. 93] ; Pearson v. Superior COllrt, 32 Cal.App.2d 87
[89 P.2d 162] ; Sullivan v. Superior Court, 72 Cal.App. 531
[237 P. 782].) This power exists even though there has been
no prior adjudication of contempt and none is sought (Knackstedt v. Superior Oourt, 79 Cal.App.2d 727 [180 P.2d 375]).
[3] It is equally well settled that failure to comply with
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the terms·of a property settlement agreement is not punishable
by contempt. (Bradley v. Superior COllrt, 48 Ca1.2d 509 [310
P.2d 634].) This rule applks eYrn though the payments in
default were designated as ehild support if these support
payments are part of the integrated property settlement
(Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 631 [328 P.2d 193] ).1
[4] Obligations arising under such an agreement, even
though the agreement is incorporatcd into the decree, are
contractual, and contempt, of course, cannot be used to punish
mere breach of contract.
In the present case the property settlement agreement is
admittedly an integrated property agreement. Thus, under
the rule of the eases cited above, Thomas cannot be punished
by contempt even if it be assumed that the facts alh·ged ill
Geraline's affidavit are true.
[ 5 ] The trial court, in the present case, has barred tIle
entry of the final deeree for what, at most, is a mere breach
of contract. To countenanee such a procedure WQuld bc
violative of the public policy of this state. That policy is not
to discourage final and permanent severance of marriages
that have failed. [ 6] It has been stated that: " ... when
a marriage has failed and the family has ceased to be a unit,
the purposes of family life are no longer served and divorce
will be permitted. '[P]ublic policy docs not discourage divorce
where the relations between husband and wife are such that
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed.' [Citing eascs.]" (De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Ca1.2d
858, at p. 864 [250 P.2d 598J.) The public interest is not
enhanced by refusing people the right to legally terminate a
relationship which has already been irrevocably severed in
fact. The power to prevent the final dissolution of such mar'The Bradley and Plumer cases have been criticized. (See Contempt
Enforcement of "Integrated" Di1:orce Settlements in Cali/oT1lia, 10
Stan.L.Re\'". 321; see also 4.3 CaI.L.Rev. iS2; 4i CaI.L.Rev. 756.)
It sllould also be noted that Civil Code section 139 wa~ amended by
Stats. HI5!), ch. 13[19, p. 36iS, to read in part, as follows: "That portion
of the dt.!erce or .judgment making any snch allowance or allowances
[~limony lind child support], and the order or orders of the court to
enforce the same, including any order for support of children based on
a proYisioll for ~n('h RUJlPort in an integrated property settlement agree·
ment, may he modified or revoked at any time at the niscretioll of the
court except aR to :my amonllt that may ha\'"e accrued prior to the orner
of modification or re\'"ocation." The amended portion of this section,
which permits the court to modify or re\'"oke <,hild support pro\'ision~
which ha\'"(' he(-n madl' part of an int,'grntl'd property settlement agree·
ment, is not applicable to agreements conclnderl priot to Sept.ember lR,
1959.
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ria::res should be uKetl only when lIel'l'ssary to presel've the
authority of the eourL
[7] It is no lon~l'l' a suffi('ipnt ha~is for tkuying an interlocutory tkl'ree that the petitioll('l' is also found tljl be at
"fault" (Dc Burgh y. Dc Burgh, supra; Civ. Code, § 132), It
should be equally immaterial that the moving party has been
guilty of a breadl of tontruc·t not constituting a eont(,lllpt,
or of some impl'oper conduct not directly related to the divorce
proceedinj!.
In Dc Burgh Y. Dc Burgh, supra, this ('ourt expressed the
conviction that en forced continuation of a relationsliip which
has been destroyed could serve no useful public policy but
would, instead, serve to foster adulterous associations as well
as intensify "the oppressive ef'fel>t upon children and the
('ommullit~- . . . . "
(39 Ca1.2d at p. 864.)
If parties are permitted to dissoh'e a marriage legally WlH'1l
the legitimate objects of that marriage haye becn destroyed, •
they will be able to build new liyes and new homes which may
possess the stability and happiness the previous relationship
lacked. At the very least they will not be forced into improper
relationships by the very law they, and their dlildrell, are
admonished to respect. That this result is of grratcr benefit
to the public welfare than enforced continuation of a status
which has been totally repudiated by the pnrtil's is obvious.
[8] California has speeified the ('x('lusive grounds upon
which legal dissolution of the marriage can be predicated
(Civ. Code, § 92). But once it has been determined that sueh
grounds exist and an interlocutory decree of divorce llas been
granted the courts should not bar entry of the final decree
upon the expiration of the interlocutory year except for compelling reasons.
[9] A court should have the right to deny its processes
and aid to one who stands in contempt or is in contempt of
its orders. One who has wilfully refnsrd to comply with the
mandate of a court cannot then compel that conrt to do his
bidding". [10] But it must be rf:'mcmhered that even though
the moving party has been ad,jndieated in contempt, the court
is not required to bar entry of the final decre(', but su('h aetion
remains within the trial eourt's (lisl'retion. If the court determines that the Jlublic interest will be better served by finally
and permanently dissolving the marital !'tatwl it i~ entirely
within its powt'r to do so. (1 Armstrong, Family Law, 271.)
[11] If one who stands ill ('ontempt of the orders of th~
court can still s('ek, and in the dis('r('tion of the rOllrt rl'('eivp,
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a final Ih'I'l'l'C of 11ivol"(,I" it woult! !'rClll .·ll'ar thai (,Ilt' who
is not ill contcmpt an!] wlto l'olllI1110t be adjud;.rul iil eontelllpL
should ~Ial\(l 011 a llighl'r planr. If tIle "I)Urt lad;:s the pow!,!,
to imposl' the punishment of COlltl'illpt it certainly "houltl lIot
he permitted to assess what is, ill act uality, a greater punishment--llenial of the l,'gal right to e11trr into any other relationship, To do so would be to permit thr trial court to inflict
the continuance of a repudiated marriage' rdationship upon
a party because of a claimed brrarh of contract.
[12] That is exartly what has happened ill the instant
case. The refusal to enter the final drcree for,'es the continuation of a marriage ",hidl is 110 longer a going unit, and has not
been such for a period of more than one year. Therc are no
allegations of reconciliation or cohabitation. Tlwre has been
neither mistake nor fraud. The parties are silllpl~- involved
in a propc'rty dispute ai'i~ing from a contract ,,·ltil'h they
freely executed, eal'h being rcpresentcd by counsel, in an
attempt to settle all propcrty obligations resulting' from their
marriag-c, The marital relationship is !"cverable from the property rights whil'h it create:;, and final settlement of the relationship should not be depcl1(lent upon final settlrmrnt of
corollary property intcrests.
[ 13 ] The concept of divisible divorce has become established in our law. Beginning with Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
[68 S.Ct. 1~13, 92 hEd. 1561, 1 A.hR2d 1412], many cases
have held that a divorce action which sewrs the personal
relationship of the parties does not nccessarily determine their
property rights, In Hudson v, Hudson, 52 Cal.2d 735 [344
P.2d 295], this court held that an ex parte divol'ce which had
terminated the marital status did not extinglli:;;h the wife's
property right to alimon~·, (Sec also Webcr '-. Superior Court,
53 Cal.2d 403 [2 Cal.Rptr. 9, 348 P.2d 572].) It is true
that these cases were concerned with the question of jurisdiction, but thry recognize the basic proposition that severance
of the personal relationship is divisible from a determination
of property and support rights.
[14] The divisible divorce is more than a jurisdictional
concept. Sevrrance of a personal relationship which the law
has founa to be unworkable and, as a result, injurious to the
public welfare is not dependent upon final srttlement of property disputes. Society will be little concerned if the parties
engage in propl'rty litig-ation of how('ver long duration; it will
be mm·h POIwr!'ned if two pl'ople are forerd to remain legally
bound to olle another wlll'n this statns can do nothing but

)

148

'\

)

)

lIULL I'. SUPERIOR COURT

[54 C.2.!

engender addit iOllal bitterness aud uuhappincss. [15] H
the partics dlOose to enter into a property agreement, termination of their personal status should not be conditioned upon
compliance with this agrcement. If they cuter into an integrated property settlement whieh provides for support payments as well as property allocation the entire agreement is
considered a property agreement (Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d
36 [265 P.2d 873], and cases cited therein; Finllegan v. Finnegall, 42 Ca1.2d 762 l269 P.2d 873]) and should be divisible
in toto from the final dissolution of their personal status.
Otherwise property disputes, real and specious, could continue
for years, effectively preventing the legal establishment of any
other relationship by either party. (See Harrold v. Harrold,
43 Cal.2d 77 [271 P .2d 489].)
[16] Thomas and Geraline entered into a negotiated
contract. If that contract has been breached, normal contract
remedies are available. Indeed, Geraline has already filed a
breach of contract action against Thomas. But if the trial
court is permitted to bar entry of the final decree because it
has determined that the contract has been breached, a very
effective remedy of the court, heretofore reserved for contempt
cases, will become a supplemental remedy for breach of contract. Geraline elected to settle her property rights by contract and she should now be required to look to contractual
remedies, if Thomas is actually in breach.
[ 17] Thomas contends that he has valid defenses which
he has a right to litigate in the pending contract action. But
the trial court, by denying his motion for final judgment, has
already impliedly adjudged him in breach. Although this
determination will not be binding in the contract action,
nevertheless the pressure being exerted upon Thomas to comply
with the terms of the contract-or reach a settlement acceptable to Geraline-whether or not he actually has a defense
to the alleged breach, is obvious. It is certainly improper to
permit withholding the final decrt'e of divorce as a club to
prevent normal determination of contract rights in a contract
action.
Geraline also urges that Thomas is not entitled to a final
decree because he committed a "fraud" upon the court. The
claimed fraud is that, in the affidavit filed in support of the
request for the entry of the final decree, Thomas avers that
he has complied with all of the requirements of the interlocutory decree. Geraline contends that Thomas knew that he
had not complied with certain provisions of the decree, and
that, t.hl'refore, this affidavit was deliberately fraudulent.
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[18] It is true that a trial court has the power to bar
entry of the final decree of divort:e if tit!' moving party attempts to obtain it by frandnh'nt means. Even a final decree
can be vacated if it has been obtained by fraud. (Miller v.
Miller, 26 Ca1.2d 119 [156 P.2d D31].) But there is no fraud
here. [19] Thomas's alleged noncompliance is the very
basis of this entire controversy. He vigorously claims and has
consistently contended that he is not in dcfault because his
failure to comply with certain terms of the decrec is excusable.
Geralille, with equal vigor, contends that his noncompliance
is not excusable. This is the very dispute that will be litigated
and determined in the pending contract action. If Thomas
were to be precluded from obtaining a final decree because
he alleged that he is not in dcfault, then the pending civil
action, in which he will seek to prove that he is not in default,
would be prejudged in advance.
[20] Furthermore, Thomas's affidavit can hardly be said
to perpetrate a fraud because his leg-al position was well
known to all concerned, including the trial court. All of the
facts involved in this propcrty dispute were before the court
when the affidavit was filed. Geraline had already filed her
affidavits setting forth Thomas's claimed misdeeds, in conjunction with her motion to bar entry of the final decree. On
September 25, 1959, three days before the allegedly fraudulent affidavit was filed, Thomas filed a statement in opposition
to Geraline's motion in which he set forth all of the facts
involved in the property dispute and explained why his failure
to comply with the decree was excusable. Under these circumstances he certainly did not attempt to perpetrate a fraud .
upon the court by filing the affidavit.
[21] Geraline also contends that the court should deny
Thomas a final judgment of divorce because he has flouted the
authority of the court by "remarrying" in Mexico during the
interlocutory year and is now living in "sin" in a bigamous
relationship within the state. There is no merit to this contention. Entry of the final decree is not a reward for good
behavior nor is the refusal to grant it a punishment. Its purpose is to finally dissolve a relationship which has been
severed in fact. It would scrve no l('gitimate purpose to compel Thomas to continue to liyc ill a state of bigamy as punishment for alrl'ady having done so. "It is a degradation of
marriage and a frustration of its jHlrpOSl'S when the courts
use it as a device for pUJlishment." (Dc Burgh v. De Burgh,
supra, 39 Ca1.2d at p. 864.)
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In Rwl \'. Reed. !) Cal.App. 748 {100 P. 897], plaintiff attempll'd to rl'"ist del'endallt's motion for entry of final judgment b~' alll'going that he hall entered into "an asswned and
pretended marriage rclatioll" during the interlocutory year,
The court there sait! : ":May the plaintiff place detectives upon
the trail of her husband, and watch him during the entire
year to see if he is still faithful to his marriage vow for the
purpose of a Bew cause of actioll f "'IV c are of opinion that such
is not the iilterpretation to be given to the sections of the code
as amended. . .. The Legislature, in the enactment of the
sections, clearly did not contemplate that at the end of the year
either party could file a supplemental complaint, and allege a
new cause of action for divorce, or that the defeated party
could, b~.. such suppleIllental pleading, set forth a cause of action by way of rccrimination, 'so as to prevent the party who
prevailed at the first trial from having a decree entered after
the expiration of the year. If such is the meaning of the stat·
ute a divorce case might be kept in court for years, or during
the life of the parties." (ld. at pp. 751,753.)
In Hirschfeld v.Hirschfeld, 165 Cal.App.2d 474 [332 P.2d
·397), the court refused to bar entry of the final decree on the
ground that the moving party had "remarried" during the
interlocutory year. The court pointed out that under the
holdings of SI/llit'an v. SlIlUt'an, 219 Cal, 734 [28 P.2d 914],
and A.ndcrs(}r1 Y. Anderson, 7 Ca1.2d 265 [60 P.2d 290], defend·
ant could have annulled his second marriage, standing on his
own wrong. "[I1]e could then procure his final divorce and
remarry the second wife and thus validate that marriage."
(ld. at p. 476.) Although the case is distinguishable, in that
the partit:s did not there cohabit bigamously in California, its
reasoning is equally applicable when the parties are living to·
gether within this state.
The court in the Hirschfeld ease saw no reason to require
a circuitous method of procuring a divorce dccree. This rea·
soning is sound. [22] It seems clear that a bigamous mar·
riage consummated during the interlocutory year is not adequate jn,:;tification for denying the bigamous party a final
decree of divorce. (State ex reI. Hansen v. SlIperior Court, 131
Wasl~1. 13 [228 P. 702].) The law cannot condemn an individual to etcrnal illicit relationships because he has once erred
simply because it docs not approve of the way in which the
union was commenced.
Once it has been decided that the court shall not be permitted to use the continuation of the marriage status as
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punishment, it wllul«l ill' allOlllalO1\S tf) h<l!li that ads whit·h,
ifcoUllllitt"d pl'ior to th(· illi""l'h'illO!'~' d"'·!'('l'. would ('011,
stitute groUlHls for dissoh'ill~ till' lIlal'l'iagc will, if l'o1llmith'd
subsequent to tllP illtcrloeutol'Y dl'l'rel" pl'eVl'llt ,iisSt)lutioll or
the marriage, '1'0 so hold would be to ret Ill'n to an cxaggl'l'uh'll I
forDl of the doctrine of recrimination expl'C'ssiy l'l'pudiated iil
De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra.
It is therefore ordered that a writ of mandate issue directing
the trial court to set aside its order llcnying the motion for the '
entry of the final decree, to enter its order granting that
motion, and thereupon to cllll!r judgllll!nt in conformity with
the order.
'
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J" MeComb, J., and Dooling, J.
pro tem.,· concurred.
White, J., cOlleurred in the judgmcnt.
TRAYNOR, J., COnCUl'l'illg.-My views with respect to the
enforcement of integrated bargains by contempt proeeedings
are set forth in dissenting opinions ill Bro!lley v. Superior
Court, 48 Ca1.2d 509, 523 [310 P.2d 634l, and Plumer v.
Superior Cow·t, 50 Ca1.2d 631,638 [328 P.2d 193]. Although
those views remain ullchanged, I am bound by those eases until
they are overruled. If they nccessarily controlled the result
in this case, I would concur in the judgmrut undcr their
compulsion. I do not believe they do, however, for in my
opinion petitioner is entitled to the entry of the final decrc('
as a matter of right even if he could be held in contempt of
court for not performing the conditions of the intC'rlocutory
decree.
Early interpretations of section 132 of the Civil Code establish that a final decree of divorce may be denied only if the
parties are no longer entitled to the dissolution of the marriage
because of condonation (O'Connell v. Superior Court, 74 Cal.
App. 350, 353 [240 P. 294] ; Lane v. Superior Coltrt, 104
Cal.App. 340, 347 [285 P. 860]) or rcconriliation (Olson v.
Superior COllrt, 175 Cal. 250, 252·253 [165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R.
1589]) ; if the parties were not entitled to the dissolution of
the marriage in the first in~tance (Carp v. Superior Court, 76
Cal.App. 481, 485 [245 P. 459] [interlocutory d('crce obtain cd
by mistake or fraud1 ; cf. McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196
Cal. 222,229-230 [237 P. 42, 40 A.IJ.R. 1110] ; MillCl' v. 'Miller,
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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:2G Ca1.2(1 110, 121 [156 P .2(1 0:31 J [sl'tt ing a~i(l,' fi nal deer,'c'
prol'ured by frautlJ); or, in the court's discretion, if the marriage has bcen (lissohe<1 by thc death of OIlC OJ" both parti('s.
(Civ. Code, § 132; Glo!Jd v. Superior Court, 44 Ca1.App. 39,
43 (185 P. 995].) Sectioll 132 also prodth's for delaying the
('utry of the final decree pendillg appcal from the interlocutory
judgment or motion for a new trial. That section has been
interpreted to achicye the strange result of postponing dissolution of the marital relationship until after an appeal from the
property part of the judgment is heard and determined, although the final decree may then be entered even if the result
of the appeal is to remand the cause for further proceeding~.
(Harrold v. IIarrold, 43 Cal.2d 77, 83-86 [2i1 P.2d 489J.)
l\I~' view that section 132 refers only to appeals from that
part of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage is set
forth in the concurring opinion in the Harrold case, 43 Cal.2tl
at 86-90. (See also 1 Armstrong, California Family Law,
272-273.) In other cases, where the parties are entitled to a
dissolution of the marriage on the merits. entry of the final
decree is a ministerial act. (Claudius v. Mcll'in, 146 Cal. 257.
260-261 [79 P. 897J ; Keller v. Keller, 122 Cal.App. 712, 715
[10 P.2d 541] ; Ringel v. Superior COllrt, 54 Ca1.App.2d 34,
35 (128 P.2d 558] ; see Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250,
251-252 [165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R. 1589] ; McGuinness v. Superior
Conrt, 196 Cal. 222, 229 [237 P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110] ; Lane v.
Superiol' Court, 104 Cal.App. 340, 345 [285 P. 860] ; ef. Angell
v. Angell, 84 Cal.App.2d 339, 342 [191 P.2d 54J ; Nemer v.
Nemer, 117 Cal.App.2d 35, 38 [254 P.2d 661].)
Four California cases would add as another ground for
denying entry of the final decree the moving party's disregard
of the court's orders. (Weeks v. Superior COlll·t, 187 Cal. 620,
622 [203 P. 93] ; Sullivan v. Supcrior Court. 72 Cal.App. 531.
535-536 (237 P. 782J ; Pearson v. Superior Court. 32 Cal.App.
2d 87, 8!) [89 P.2d 162] ; Knackstedt v. Superior Court, 79
Cal.App.2d 727, 729 [180 P.2d 375].) The Weeks case, upon
which the other three cases rest, relies upon O'Neill v. Thomas
Day Co., 152 Cal. 357, 362-363 [92 P. 856, 14 Ann.Cas. 970],
a personal injury action in which plaintiff refused to answer
pertinent questions under subpoena at a deposition proceeding. The court's declaration in 0 'Neill that "certainly no
plaintiff can, with right or reason, ask the aid anu assistance
of a court in hearing his demands, while he stands in an attitude of contempt to its legal orders and processes" was not
formulated with the policy considerations appropriate to a
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divorce action in mind. The \Y ('eks l'Olll't 11lltlet·took to incorporate the 0 'Neill rule into divorce law by relring upon
the Olson case, supra, 175 Cal. 250, 252-253. The Olson
case, however, was ill suited to that purpose, for it inyolvcu
an unconditional reconciliation-a situation plainly distinguishable from contempt and one in which entry of thl' final
decree is not ordinarily wa rrantcd. The 'Weeks case failed
to notice the significant diffrrencr in terms of public policy
between a final decree of divorce anu other processes withhelu
from disobedient contestants in eh'il eases.
A court's power to withhold its processes, like its power to
punish for contempt, rests on the necessity of upholding the
court's dignity and enforcing its orders, (See In rc Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 532 [34 P. 227, 37 Am.St.Rep. 78, 21 A.L.R.
755] ; Raiden v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 83, 86 [206 P.2d
1081] .) A court exercising this power may dismiss (K l100b
v. Knoob, 192 Cal. 93, 97 [218 P. 568] ; MacPherson v. JlaePherson, 13 Ca1.2d 271, 277 [89 P.2d 382]) or stay (Borenstein v. Borenstein, 11 Ca1.2d 301, 302 [78 P.2d 388] ; Ilrog
v. Krog, 32 Ca1.2d 812, 818-819 [198 P.2d 510]; Kopasz v.
Kopasz, 34 Ca1.2d 423, 425 [210 P.2d 846]) the appeal of a
recalcitrant party to the divorce action: deny a change of
venue (Ross v. Ross, 48 Cal.App.2d 72, 78 [119 P.2d 444] ) ;
refuse to permit the taking of depositions (Paddon v. Superior
Court, 65 Cal.App. 479, 479-480 [224 P. 474]) or the introduction I)f evidcnce (Schubert Y. Superior COltl't, 10!) Cal.App.
633, 635-636 [293 P. 814] ) ; refuse to vacate an interlocutory
(Travis v. Trauis, 89 Cal.App.2d 292, 295 [200 P.2d 843J) or
a final decree (Soderberg v. Sode/'bcry, 63 Cal.App. 492, 494495 [219 P. 82J) ; or deny the writs of mandate and prohibition
(Funfar v. Superior Cmtrl, 107 Cal.App. 488, 490-491 [290
P. 626] ). (See alRo the questionable exercise of this power in
Kubon v. Kubon, 51 Cal.2d 229, 232 [331 P.2d 636J ; dissenting
opinion, 233.) \Vhen, however, there has beell a final determination that the marriage should be disRolyccl, it is my
opinion that the public interest in vindicating judieial dignity
should yield to its interest in preserving the sanctity of marriage when the proeC5S soug-ht to be withheld is a final decree
of divorce, for" lilt is a degradation of marriage and a frustration of its purposcs when the courts use it as a clevire for
punishment." (Dc Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 864
[250 P.2d 598].)
I would therefore overrule the \Yeeks case and disapprove
the Sullivan, Pearsoll, and Knackstedt cases alld hoW that the

I

154

IN

I~E

GHO\"lo:~

[5·l C.2d

trial court lacks discretion to withhold cutry of the final decree
of divorce solely because the moving party stands in disregard
of its orders.
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